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Pyroprocess technology has been considered as a fuel cycle option to solve the spent fuel
accumulation problems in Korea. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon,
Korea has been studying pyroprocess technology, and the conceptual design of an
engineering-scale pyroprocess facility, called the Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocess
Facility, has been performed on the basis of a 10 ton heavy metal throughput per year. In
this paper the concept of Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocess Facility is introduced
along with its safety requirements for the protection of facility workers, collocated
workers, the off-site public, and the environment. For the identification of safety struc-
tures, systems, and components and/or administrative controls, the following activities
were conducted: (1) identifying hazards associated with operations; (2) identifying poten-
tial events associated with these hazards; and (3) identifying the potential preventive and/
or mitigative controls that reduce the risk associated with these accident events. This
study will be used to perform a safety evaluation for accidents involving any of the hazards
identified, and to establish safety design policies and propose a more definite safety design.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Spent fuel (SF) is an inevitable byproduct of nuclear power
generation. SF is highly radioactive waste which contains
uranium, transuranic elements, and fission products. The
direct disposal and interim storage of SF require wide and
isolated areas, and thus it is not easy to find proper sites in.-I. Moon).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behaKorea. Therefore, the development of an effective manage-
ment or recycling technology for SF is essential to enhance
nonproliferation and environmental friendliness.
In Korea, pyroprocess technology has been considered as a
fuel cycle option to solve SF accumulation problems. Pyro-
processing is one of the key technologies used to recover
actinide elements and long-lived fission products from the SFCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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tion. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea
has been developing a pyroprocess technology for the recy-
cling of SFs. A hot cell facility for the demonstration of an
electrolytic reduction process, named Advanced SF Condi-
tioning Process Facility, was developed in 2005 [1,2]. PyRo-
process Integrated inactive DEmonstration facility (PRIDE)
was developed in 2012. In this facility, a full pyroprocess flow
can be tested and its integrated performance will be verified
[3,4]. In PRIDE, depleted uranium is used for the process, and
the maximum throughput is 10 tHM (ton heavy metal) per
year. As the next stage of PRIDE, Engineering-Scale Pyropro-
cess Facility (ESPF), having radiation shielding capability to
deal with SFs and the same SF treatment capability as PRIDE,
was planned by 2016 but the plan was canceled. Instead of
ESPF, a conceptual design of Reference Engineering-scale
Pyroprocess Facility (REPF), of which design requirement
was the same as ESPF's, was performed as a reference facility
to be used for development of pyroprocess technology.
Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho Falls, ID, USA) conducted
a conceptual design of an Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and
accident analyses for it to support the development of
advanced technologies related to safeguards and security,
instrumentation, process control, and integration, and to
provide data on the reliability and scale-up for full-scale
separations and fuel fabrication facilities [5e8]. In addition,
Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (Ibaraki, Japan)
have proposed concepts for safety systems in pyrochemical
reprocessing systems and performed safety evaluations [9].
In this paper, the concept of REPF was introduced, and a
hazard evaluation was performed for identification of its
safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and spe-
cific administrative controls (SACs).Fig. 1 e Process flow diagram of Reference Engineering-scale Py2. Facility overview
REPF for the pyroprocess demonstration consists of: (1) pro-
cessing equipment; (2) a hot cell facility and a building struc-
ture to shield and isolate the process equipment; (3) hot cell
remote operation equipment for safety operation and main-
tenance; (4) an argon system to control the inert atmosphere
of a process cell; (5) a utility supply facility; (6) material receipt
and storage areas for SF; and (7) a waste treatment area and a
shipping facility.
Themain process involves the disassembly and rod cutting
of SF assemblies, chopping and decladding, voloxidation,
electrolytic-reduction, electro-refining, electro-winning, salt
purification and recovery, waste form fabrication, off-gas
treatment, and so on. Fig. 1 shows a flow diagram of REPF.
2.1. Design requirements
REPF can process a maximum of 10 tHM/yr of pressurized
water reactor (PWR) fuel. The other top-tier requirements
such as the operation rate, product and waste storage facility,
reference SF, facility design life, and so on, are given in Table 1.
The safety class, seismic class, and quality class of the SSCs
of a nuclear facility are classified according to their functions.
The safety class is a criterion that should be applied to design
the SSCs for PWR plants, and the classification criteria are
presented in ANSI51.1 (nuclear safety criteria for the design of
stationary PWR plants). In the case of REPF, there are no SSCs
considered as safety classes 1 and 2. A hot cell structure and
other SSCs requiring an equivalent structural integrity with
the hot cell are classified in safety class 3, which can be
assigned to the SSCs of which a loss of function can cause the
radiological dose limit at the site boundary to be exceeded. Inroprocess Facility. TRU, transuranic elements; U, uranium.
Table 1 e Top-tier requirements of Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocess Facility.
Item Requirements
Throughput  10 tHM/yr
Spent fuel storage capacity  10 tHM
Reference
Spent fuel
 16  16 PWR Type, 4.5 wt.% U-235
 55,000 MWD/MTU, 10 yr cooling
Availability  70% (in consideration of O&M outage)
 200 equivalent full operating calendar d
Design life  40 Years (building & cell structure)
 20 Years (equipment)
Input  PWR spent fuels
Output  U metal ingot, U-TRU-RE metal ingot for SFR fuel
 Wastes (ceramic, metal, virtrified form)
Main function  Temporary material storages (PWR spent fuel, metal ingot, waste)
 PWR spent fuel disassembling, rod chopping
 Decladding, voloxidation, electrolytic reduction, electro-refining, electro-winning, cd distillation,
cathode processing
 U & TRU metal ingot fabrication
 Salt waste recycling, waste treatment, off-gas treatment
PWR, pressurized water reactor; SFR, sodium-cooled fast reactor; TRU, transuranic elements; U, uranium.
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category I, and the SSCs having the possibility to affect the loss
of safety functions of seismic category I SSCs under an
earthquake were considered as seismic category II SSCs. The
main building structure and overhead crane in REPF can be
categorized as seismic category II. Table 2 shows themain SSC
classifications for REPF, developed by Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute. The hot cell structure and hot cell inlet/
outlet filter perform a safety function isolating the radioactive
material, and their loss of safety function can cause the
radiological dose limit at the site boundary to be exceeded,
and thuswere considered as the SSCs of safety class 3, seismic
category I, and quality class Q. The hot cell liner, radiation
shielding window, transfer lock, rear door, and feed through
were also classified as the same class as the hot cell structure.
For pyroprocessing, it is necessary to develop high-
temperature (650C) molten salt technology with a stringent
inert atmosphere control. In REPF, the argon system was
designed to control impurities such as water vapor and oxy-
gen, and maintain negative pressure in the argon atmosphere
cell. The argon system consists of an argon supply unit, an
argon gas cooling and circulation unit, and an argon gas pu-
rification unit. The argon gas purification unit has a function
to maintain less than 15 ppmwater vapor and 40 ppm oxygen
in the cell atmosphere. The argon gas pressure release unit
controls the pressure in the cell from excess overpressure of
75 mmAq and underpressure of 300 mmAq.
2.2. Facility layout
REPF is divided into a main process building and support
buildings. The hot cells are contained within three stories of a
large, single seven-story main process building including one
basement level. The building has a length of 100 m, a width of
40m, and a height of 48m, including a 9mhigh basement. The
auxiliary buildings used to support the main process building
are composed of an administration building, a fire house, a
workshop building, a gas storage building, a utility building,
and a health physics building, which are located around the
main process building.The first floor provides space for the process cells, oper-
ating area, service area, main entrance area, truck bay, office
area, and so on, as shown in Fig. 2. The decontamination cell, a
storage room for the waste and process products, an electric
room, an argon system, a service area, a utility supply system
area, and so on, were arranged to be located in the first
basement level. A maintenance cell, a chemical analysis lab-
oratory, an office area, and a viewing area are provided on the
third floor, and a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
room was arranged on the fourth through the sixth floors.
Sectional views of the main process building are shown in
Fig. 3, where the overall layout can be seen.3. Identification of potential accident
scenarios
The hazard analysis is performed to identify and evaluate
potential accidents, and to identify bounding accident sce-
narios (design basis accident scenarios) that require further
quantitative development. In addition, the technical safety
requirements for defense in depth and the significant safety
functions performed by SSCs are established by hazard eval-
uation results.
The results of the hazard analysis of REPF are presented
and summarized in this chapter. Hazard analysis contains a
comprehensive evaluation of potential process-related haz-
ards, natural hazards, and man-made external hazards that
can affect facility workers, the off-site public, and the envi-
ronment by single or multiple failures. Available consider-
ation at this point is given to all modes of operation, including
startup, shutdown, and abnormal testing or maintenance
configurations, as well as the potential for equipment failure
and human error to identify hazards. Hazard analysis pro-
vides a thorough qualitative evaluation of risks to the facility
workers, the collocated workers, the off-site public, and the
environment due to accidents involving identified hazards.
This methodology is used for grouping and screening of haz-
ards and for selecting representative accident scenarios.
Table 2 e Main equipment classification of Reference
Engineering-scale Pyroprocess Facility.






1. Hot cell structure 3 I Q
2. Hot cell liner 3 I Q
3. Radiation shielding window 3 I Q
4. Transfer lock 3 I Q
5. Feed-through 3 I Q
6. Rear door 3 I Q
7. Manipulator NNS III A
8. In-cell crane/EMM
(electro-mechanical manipulator)
or TM (telescopic manipulator)
NNS III A
9. Inter-cell door NNS III A
10. Fire protection system in hot cell NNS III S
11. Process equipment in hot cell NNS III S
12. Electrical system in hot cell NNS III S
13. Ar system NNS III A
14. Hot cell inlet/outlet filter 3 I Q
15. AHU (air heating unit)/ACU
(air cooling unit)
NNS II A
16. Compressed air system NNS III S
17. Cooling water system NNS III S
18. Main building NNS II A
19. Overhead crane (main building) NNS II A
NNS, nonnuclear safety.
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A hazard is defined as a source of danger (i.e., material, energy
source, or operation)with the potential to cause illness, injury,
or death to personnel or damage to an operation or the envi-
ronment (without regard for the likelihood or credibility of
accident scenarios or consequence mitigation) [10]. The
fundamental hazards affecting REPF can be categorized intoFig. 2 e Conceptual designprocess-related hazards, natural hazards, and manmade
external hazards. Among the hazards, SF, radioactive mate-
rials, toxic materials, and combustibles are included in
process-related hazard materials. Hazard identification ac-
tivities were conducted, and some process-related hazards
and natural hazards were identified. However, manmade
external eventswere not considered as a unique hazard in this
study, and that could be dealt with after establishing security
design policies.
In this study, a preliminary hazard checklist evaluation
was used to identify potential facility hazards. Table 3 shows
the material and energy hazard sources that have the poten-
tial to lead to an uncontrolled release of radioactive or haz-
ardous materials from REPF. The SF cask area, active material
storage area, transfer tunnel area, air cell area, argon cell area,
and operating area were considered to determine the pre-
liminary initial events. As a result of a preliminary hazard
checklist evaluation for REPF, a total of 41 candidate initial
events were determined.3.2. Hazard categorization
Facility hazard categorization is necessary since the facility
category provides the regulatory basis for the amount of
required accident analysis and selection of safety SSCs and
ACs. Determining the correct facility hazard category involves
comparing the facility radioactive material content to
threshold values of radioactive material, which are specified
in DOE-STD-1027 [11]. Hazard category 3 nuclear facilities
have the potential for localized consequences, and have suf-
ficiently low quantities of radioactive material that no po-
tential exists for an accidental criticality. Hazard category 2
nuclear facilities have the potential for on-site consequences,
and have sufficient quantities of fissionablematerial to lead to
an accidental criticality. Hazard category 1 nuclear facilitieslayout of the first floor.
Fig. 3 e Sectional view of conceptual design layout. (A) Front section view. (B) Side section view.
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level greater than 20 MWt.
Depletion calculations are used to determine the hazard
category of REPF. Using the SCALE 6.0 code package, an
ORIGEN-ARP depletion calculation for 10 tHM of PWR SF with
burnup of 55,000 MWD/MTU and 10 years of cooling was
performed. The depletion and decay calculations in Table 4show that both the individual quantities of important
radioactive isotopes such as Sr-90, Cs-134, Cs-137, Pu-239,
and Pu-241 and the sum of the isotopes easily exceed the
isotopic threshold of hazard category 2. According to this
result, it is clear that REPF, which uses PWR SFs as a feeding
material, should be categorized as a hazard category 2 nu-
clear facility.
Table 3 e Result of hazard identification.
Hazard Hazard source Concern
Fissionable materials Fissionable materials in sf storage vault, process
vessels, & active material storage area
Potential for a nuclear criticality
Radioactive materials Radioactive materials in SF storage vault, process
vessels, & active material storage area
Potential radioactive material release &/or direct
radiation exposure hazard to the facility workers, the




Hazardous materials in process vessels (e.g., liquid
cadmium, chlorine)
Potential hazardous material release & subsequent
chemical exposure hazard to the facility workers, the
collocated workers, the off-site public, &/or the
environment
Fire, explosion Pyrophoric metals (e.g., uranium); combustible
materials &/or waste
Potential fire or explosion & subsequent loss of
containment resulting in a material release, leading to
a radiological or chemical exposure hazard to the
facility workers, the collocated workers, the off-site
public, &/or the environment
Electrical energy Electrical panels, electrical utilities, instrumentation,
& controls
Kinetic energy Moving loads: cask transfer cart or truck, hydraulic
ram, cask, rotating equipment (e.g., crane)
Potential to cause a loss of containment, resulting a
material release, leading to a radiological or chemical
exposure hazard to the facility workers, the collocated
workers, the off-site public, &/or the environment
Potential energy Suspended loads: crane, hoist, lift, electromechanical
manipulators (EMMs)
Pressure Compressed gas
External events Fire, plane crash
Natural phenomena Earthquake, extreme wind, flood, lightning
Potential asphyxiants Argon gas Simple asphyxiants do not pose a chemical toxicity
hazard but may cause injury to facility workers due to
oxygen displacement in confined spaces
Thermal energy Process equipment, lights No direct hazard butmay cause injury to facility workers
EMM, electro-mechanical manipulator; SF, spent fuel.
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A qualitative hazard evaluation was performed to select the
potential hazardous events and causes at REPF. Internal
events happen as a result of operator error and equipment
failure during process or facility operation. An analysis of
postulated accidents caused by malevolent acts is not within
the scope of this study.
In this study, a hazard evaluation of REPF and associated
operations was conducted using a preliminary hazard anal-
ysis (PHA) [12]. The results of the PHA serve as the basis for
hazard ranking so that bounding accident scenarios can be
selected. The procedure is qualitatively driven and relies on
experience and engineering judgment. The procedure re-
quires careful use of unmitigated scenario evaluation to
ensure rigorous selection of safety-SSCs and ACs along with
identification of defense-in-depth equipment and ACs.
The most important outcome of the hazard analysis pro-
cedure is the development of the hazard evaluation table. The
hazard evaluation table provides a succinct assessment of the
potential hazard events, their unmitigated frequency and
consequences, as well as the physical and ACs available to
reduce the event frequency and/or consequences. Examples
of some events summarized in the hazard evaluation table are
provided in Tables 5 and 6.
The content of the hazard evaluation table provides a
condensed summary of an accident scenario, the event initi-
ator, the unmitigated event frequency, the unmitigated event
consequences, the overall risk estimate, and a listing of design
and administrative items that can prevent or mitigate the
dose associated with the event. The dose evaluationguidelines (EGs), both the DOE-STD-3009 25 rem EG [10] and
supplemental EGs, can be used to establish the consequence
category. When the consequence category and likelihood
category are selected, the resulting risk bin can be identified
[12,13]. The risk bin result determines if the event merits se-
lection of safety SSCs or ACs.
The facility hazards presented in Table 3 may result in an
uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous material and
direct radiation exposure, and were evaluated using the PHA;
preliminary bounding accidents were then selected. As a
result of the PHA for the 41 candidate initial events, 10 initial
events falling into hazard ranking 1 or 2 were determined as
bounding initial events. Table 5 shows an example of a PHA
for important initial events selected as bounding events.
3.4. Preventive and mitigative features
From the analysis in accordancewith the PHA, the controls for
REPF were derived, which are shown in Table 6. Some addi-
tional features are also listed for hazard events not requiring
formal derived controls.
There are some events involving loss of the argon atmo-
sphere in the argon cell that lead to pyrophoric material (e.g.,
uranium) fires. Pyrophoricmaterial fires occurwhen air enters
the argon cell through: (1) a transfer lock; (2) a passive pene-
tration breach; or (3) a loss of confinement owing to cata-
strophic equipment failure or crane/electro-mechanical
manipulator bridge failure and subsequent damage to an
argon cell penetration, resulting in exposure of pyrophoric
material to air and radioactive material release. These events
are considered unlikely because it would require amassive in-
Table 4 e Hazard category sum-of-the-fractions
determination.
Isotope Threshold of hazard
category 2 (g)
10 tHM of PWR
spent fuel (g)
Fraction
Sr-90 1.6  102 7.877  102 4.92
Cs-134 4.6  101 7.850  101 1.71
Cs-137 1.0  103 1.586  104 15.86
Pu-239 9.0  102 6.113  104 67.92
Pu-241 2.8  101 1.131  104 403.92
Total 494.33
PWR, pressurized water reactor.
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judged to be moderate since the pyrophoric fire will require
significant time to progress, and the radioactive material will
require significant time to propagate from the argon cell to the
operating area. Because the results events are unacceptable,
safety analysis commitments should be considered tomanage
the collocated worker and facility worker risk from a pyro-
phoric material fire in the argon cell. Four safety analysis
commitments were identified: (1) transfer lock dual door air-
locks; (2) ACs on transfer lock operation; (3) AC on quantity of
exposed pyrophoric material inside argon cell; and (4) AC on
the transfer lock leak rate.
Damage andmeltdown of a SF assembly is themost severe
event that results in the release of radioactive materials out of
the normal confinement barriers. This is considered an un-
likely event. Considering about 10 tons of SF, which is the
storage capacity per year, the potential consequences areTable 5 e Summary of Reference Engineering-scale Pyroproces
No. Hazardous event Initiator/cause
1 Fire and explosions:
Air enters argon cell via open, active
penetration (transfer lock) resulting
in exposure of pyrophoric materials




2 Radioactive material release:
Damage and meltdown of spent fuel
assembly resulting in release of
radioactive material
Loss of cooling in spen
fuel storage vault
3 Direct radiation exposure:
Loss of air or argon cell shielding
resulting in direct radiation




4 Inadvertent nuclear criticality:
Inadvertent nuclear criticality in
argon cell or waste storage cell
Fissionable material
inadvertently arrang
in sufficient mass a
geometry for critica
to occur





6 Natural phenomena hazards:
Earthquake results in severe
building structural damage/collapse &
results in radioactive material release
Evaluation basis
earthquakejudged to be high to all receptors. Therefore, considering the
risk index matrix, the results are unacceptable. Controls
should be considered to manage all receptors, and one control
(safety-class SSC) was identified: a storage vault design to
prevent meltdown of SF assemblies.
There are some events involving loss of air or argon cell
shielding. These events are considered unlikely based on the
design. Because of the distance, the consequences to all re-
ceptors, which are off-site public, collocated workers, facility
workers, and environment, are judged to be negligible, but the
facility worker consequence is judged to be moderate.
Therefore, the results are unacceptable, and controls should
be considered to manage the facility worker risk from loss of
cell shielding events. Three controlswere identified: (1) air and
argon cell structure; (2) air and argon cell shielding; and (3) AC
on restrictions on direct radiation exposure.
Inadvertent nuclear criticality occurring inside the argon or
waste storage cell is considered unlikely based on thematerial
configuration and limited material quantity. An inadvertent
nuclear criticality can give high consequence severity to the
facility workers, low to the collocated workers, and negligible
to the public and the environment. Considering the risk
ranking matrix, the facility worker consequence is unaccept-
able. Controls should be considered to manage the facility
worker risk from an inadvertent nuclear criticality. Three
controls were identified: (1) argon and waste storage cell
shielding; (2) AC on personnel access restrictions for specific
areas; and (3) AC on a mass tracking program to keep in-
ventories below the mass limit of fissionable materials.
A chlorine gas release event was considered as a repre-
sentative nonradioactive hazardous material release event.s Facility hazard evaluation results.


























































Table 6 e Summary of identified controls.
No. Hazardous event Preventive and mitigative features
Design Administrative
1 Fire & explosions:
Air enters argon cell via open, active
penetration (transfer lock) resulting in
exposure of pyrophoric materials to
air & release of radioactive material
Transfer lock dual door airlocks
Argon cell atmosphere monitoring
Transfer lock door positions monitored
Hot cell exhaust system
Building exhaust system
Building structure
AC(s) on transfer lock operation
AC on quantity of exposed pyrophoric
material inside argon cell
AC on transfer lock leak rate
Operator training
Approved procedures
2 Radioactive material release:
Damage & meltdown of spent fuel
assembly resulting in release of
radioactive material






3 Direct radiation exposure:
Loss of air or argon cell shielding
resulting in direct radiation exposure to
facility workers
Air and argon cell structure
Air and argon cell shielding




4 Inadvertent nuclear criticality:
Inadvertent nuclear criticality in argon
cell or waste storage cell
Argon cell shielding
Waste storage cell shielding
Building structure
Mass tracking program
AC on personnel access restrictions








6 Natural phenomena hazards:
Earthquake results in severe building




AC on quantity of pyrophoric material
inside argon cell
Ac on radioactive material inventory
Emergency management program
AC, administrative controls.
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break resulting in a release of chlorine is unlikely. The
consequence is moderate to facility workers, negligible to
collocated workers, the public, and the environment. The
result is unacceptable, and safety analysis commitments
should be considered to manage the facility worker risk. One
control was identified: a chlorine gas evacuation system,
which is activated by a chlorine gas monitoring system and
alarms.
A seismic event that causes enough damage to the facility
structure to damage radioactive material confinements is
considered unlikely and could result in the release of radio-
activematerials from the process hot cell. The consequence of
this event is high to the facility workers, moderate to the
collocated workers, and low to the public. Environmental
consequences are judged to be negligible. With high and
moderate consequences to the facility and collocatedworkers,
respectively, the results are unacceptable. Controls should be
considered to manage the worker risk from the evaluation
basis earthquake. Four controls were identified: (1) an air and
argon cell structure; (2) AC on the quantity of exposed pyro-
phoric material in the argon cell; (3) AC on REPF radioactive
material inventory; and (4) an emergency management
program.
The hazard evaluation results described in Table 6 show
that REPF is designed and operated using safety SSCs and ACs
that protect the off-site public, collocated workers, facility
workers, and environment from the associated hazard events.
Based on the estimated risks, some safety-significant SSCs
and ACs were identified for the facility and the collocatedworkers, and one safety-class SSC was identified for protec-
tion of the off-site public. The identified SSCs for each event
will be credited for preventing or mitigating the events
through accident analyses in ongoing study.4. Summary
The conceptual design of an engineering-scale pyroprocess
facility, the REPF, developed by the Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute, was reviewed. A hazard evaluation for the
facility was performed for identification of the safety SSCs and
ACs. As results of the hazard evaluation, some safety-
significant SSCs and ACs were then identified for the facility
and the collocated workers, and one safety-class SSC was
identified for protection of the off-site public. This study will
be used to perform a safety evaluation for accidents involving
any of the hazards identified, and to establish safety design
policies and propose a more definite safety design.r e f e r e n c e s
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